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SURVEY OF RECENT DECISIONS BY THE NORTH
CAROLINA SUPREME COURT IN THE AREA
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DAN EL H. POLLITT*
It is difficult to be a free and civilized citizen unless one lives in a
free and civilized society. In many important respects, the courts are the
guardians of our collective freedoms, and their decisions provide a bench-
mark by which our freedoms can be measured. This "bench-mark" is
ep.ecially apparent in those decisions regulating the methods by which
society judges those charged with crimes.
This article is a survey of the decisions by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in the area of criminal procedure from the fall term of
1968 until the present. The decisions are reported in volumes 275, 276,
and the first two advance issues of 277 of the North Carolina Reports.
The writer of this article prefers to minimize personal comment and let
the reader judge for himself whether or not the decisions of the North
Carolina Supreme Court constitute a "bench-mark" that sufficiently en-
sures the criminal defendant his measure of our collective freedoms.
The cases are categorized and discussed in roughly the order in which
the issues arise during a criminal proceeding, beginning with the arrest
of a suspect and culminating with the sentencing of a convicted defendant.
I. ARRsT
The criminal proceedings generally begin with the arrest of a suspect.
The constitutional backdrop is the fourth amendment, which provides in
relevant part that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons
... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.., particularly describing
the ... persons . . .to be seized." 1
One of the current controversial issues under the fourth amendment is
whether the police must "knock" and announce themselves prior to entry
into a dwelling where they suspect illegal activity. This issue was decided
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This article
was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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by the Supreme Court of North Carolina against "no-knock" in State v.
SParroW.2
Mr. and Mrs. Sparrow rented a large two-story house in Charlotte,
and from twenty to twenty-five persons of both sexes lived in the house
with them, some on a permanent basis and others temporarily. The rules
of the house required permanent residents to contribute to the payment
of rent, food, and so on, and it was necessary for a visitor to be at least
sixteen years of age to stay overnight.
The police suspected that a young, runaway girl was staying at the
Sparrow house, and six policemen, armed with a warrant, went to the
house to take her into custody. Three of them went to the front door;
the other three gained access through the rear. The officers at the front
door were not in uniform. The officers testified that they "knocked" on
the door, were told to "come in," and did so. The Sparrows denied this.
In any event, when the officers entered, the young runaway tried to
escape; "Officer Maness caught her around the waist, whereupon [the
runaway] bit him on the hand and Marvin [Mr. Sparrow] jumped on
the officer's back. When Lieutenant Hall took hold of Marvin and told
him he was under arrest, Katherine attempted to free her husband and
kicked Lieutenant Hall."
Mr. Sparrow was charged and convicted of obstructing a public
officer in the discharge of his duties and sentenced to a jail sentence of
between eight and twelve months.
The supreme court reversed in an opinion by Justice Moore, who
wrote:
Ordinarily, a police officer, absent invitation or permission, may not
enter a private home to make an arrest or otherwise seize a person
unless he first gives notice of his authority and purpose and makes a
demand for and is refused entry. Without special or emergency cir-
cumstances, an entry by an officer which does not comply with these
requirements is illegal. Officers have no duty to make an illegal entry
into a person's home. Hence, one who resists an illegal entry is not
resisting an officer in the discharge of the duties of his office. These
views are in accordance with the ancient rules of the common law and
are predicated on the constitutional principle that a person's -home is
his castle.4
2276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970).
8Id. at 504, 173 S.E.2d at 900.
"Id. at 512, 173 S.E.2d at 905-06.
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The crucial question then was whether the officers entered the Sparrow
home legally, i.e., after knocking and demanding entry. The trial court
failed to submit this factual controversy for the determination of the
jury, and "error in this respect was prejudicial and sufficient to entitle
Marvin to a new trial."5
State v. McCloud" also involved a warrantless police intrusion into a
man's "castle," this time his rented room at the Holiday Inn South in
Greensboro. In the early morning hours of March 28, 1969, it was dis-
covered that the Florida Street Baptist Church in Greensboro had been
entered and the contents of a safe stolen. The officers suspected McCloud
of being one of the two culprits involved. They went to the motel room
where he was staying with his girl friend and arrested him on the charge
of "occupying a room for immoral purposes." Some incriminating coins
were found in the room incident to a search after the arrest.
North Carolina General Statutes section 15-41 authorizes an arrest
of a person who has committed a felony or misdemeanor in the presence
of the officer, or when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a felony or misdemeanor in his
presence. The North Carolina Supreme Court, per Justice Branch, held
that this statute did not authorize the officers to enter the premises without
arrest warrants on the theory that a "minor immoral offense" was being
committed in their presence:
It would seem that unless the misdemeanor is committed in the
presence of the officer in the sense that at the time of its commission
through his sensory perception he might know that a misdemeanor is
being committed in his presence or have reasonable ground to believe
that a misdemeanor has been committed in his presence, that an arrest
cannot be made without a warrant.y
The court held that as a consequence of this illegal entry, the coins
taken from the motel room were unlawfully seized and could not be
admitted into evidence. However, as will be shown shortly, the constitu-
tional victory of McCloud was not complete.
State v. Moore" also involved an arrest without a warrant for a mis-
demeanor. On Saturday night, April 6, 1968, there was a riot in Wilson,
and some stores were damaged and looted. On Sunday, April 7, Detective
5Id. at 513, 173 S.E.2d at 906.
'276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753 (1970).
"Id. at 526, 173 S.E.2d at 759 (emphasis added).
'275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969).
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Davis received information "from a certain person" that Moore had been
one of three persons who had broken windows at a grocery store. On
Monday, April 8, two detectives went to Moore's house and put him
under arrest. They did not have an arrest warrant.
The supreme court, per Justice Branch, held that the arrest was
illegal because the "defendant was charged with a misdemeanor and the
record clearly discloses that the alleged misdemeanors did not occur in the
presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrests were made without
warrants."9
The result was different in State v. Roberts.'0 There, Agent Windham
received information "from a confidential informant" that the defendant
was selling LSD in the vicinity of the Village Shoppe Restaurant in
Fayetteville. Agent Windham called Lieutenant Struder, and the two of
them took up observation positions near the restaurant. "For approx-
imately fifteen or twenty minutes they observed the defendant and another
man in a parking lot.., milling around the parking lot talking to several
other persons."'1 The defendant then entered a washerette a few doors
from the restaurant; the officers followed him and put him under arrest.
They then searched him and found LSD in his glove. The officers had no
search or arrest warrants at the time of the arrest.
The supreme court, per Justice Lake, upheld the validity of the arrest:
at the time of the arrest of this defendant, Lieutenant Struder had
reasonable ground to believe the defendant was then in possession of
some quantity of lysergic acid diethylamide. . . Agent Windham,
some twenty mintues earlier, had been advised by a confidential in-
former .. . that the defendant and a male companion were each in
possession of a quantity of lysergic acid diethylamide and were then
"dealing in it" in the vicinity of the Village Shoppe Restaurant....
What they saw, considered in the light of their own experience in the
investigation of such offenses, confirmed in their opinion, the information
so given by the informer.... Under these circumstances, the officers
clearly had the right to arrest the defendant though they had no warrant
for his arrest. Having the right to arrest him, they had the right to
search him and take from him the lysergic acid diethylamide .... 12
9Id. at 145-46, 166 S.E.2d at 56. Although Moore was ahead at this stage of
the opinion, the aftermath was more to the liking of the state. See text at note 28
infra.10276 N.C. 98, 171 S.E.2d 440 (1970).
11Id. at 100, 171 S.E.2d at 441.1 Id. at 104-05, 171 S.E.2d at 444. Compare Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1967).
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State v. JacobsJ3 also concerned "probable cause" for an arrest.
There, a lady en route to Charlotte was warned by a car behind her that
something was wrong. She pulled over to the side of the road, and Jacobs
pulled up behind her. He told her that something was wrong with her
wheel and volunteered to fix it. Since other cars had flashed their lights at
her, the lady readily accepted the services of this Good Samaritan. Jacobs,
an automobile mechanic, spent thirty minutes fixing her wheel and then
pushed her off a steep embankment into the bushes where he raped her.
Thereafter, she went back to her car, drove to a nearby service station,
and reported the rape to the police. She also reported that her assailant
drove a dark blue car with High Point city tag 15339 or 13559. The
police traced the number 13559 to Jacobs, drove to his house, and put him
under arrest. A dark blue car with High Point license number 13559 was
parked outside Jacobs' house. After warning him of his constitutional
rights, the police took him to the station house where he confessed. Jacobs
subsequently repudiated the confession and argued that, in any event, it
was vitiated by the illegal arrest. The court, per Justice Branch, held
that the arrest was not without probable cause.
II. SEARCH
The fourth amendment not only protects against unreasonable arrest,
but also against unreasonable searches. There were several cases involving
this problem during the period of the survey.
In State v. Robbi," 4 Deputy Sheriff Duncan was told to go to the
house of Ferrell Robbins. When he arrived, he met Robbins' two brothers
who said that they had received a telephone call earlier from Ferrell, that
they could not understand what he was saying, and that they were worried
that something was wrong. The screen door was locked from the inside,
and Mr. Robbins' car was parked in front. Deputy Sheriff Duncan
"hollered" and beat on the door and the window without receiving any
answer. He could not open the door, but one of the brothers brought him
an iron bar which he used to break out a panel of glass so he could reach
inside and unlock the door. When he entered the house, he saw Mrs.
Robbins lying dead on the floor with Mr. Robbins, gun in hand, lying
wounded nearby.
When, at the trial, Deputy Sheriff Duncan sought to describe what
" 277 N.C. 151, 176 S.E.2d 833 (1970).
1-'275 N.C. 537, 169 S.E.2d 858 (1969).
[Vol. 49
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he saw when he entered the house, Robbins objected on the theory that
the entry was illegal. The supreme court, per Justice Branch, in reviewing
the trial court's decision to admit Duncan's testimony, rejected this con-
tention:
In the instant case the officer was not engaged in a search for evi-
dence to be used in a criminal prosecution. He entered defendant's
dwelling at the request of defendant's brothers, who were very appre-
hensive and worried about defendant .... He was simply lending the
strong arm of the law to a distressed family who feared that harm had
come to their brother and sister-in-law. The officer's presence was
lawful and his testimony as to things in plain view was properly ad-
mitted into evidence. 15
State v. VirgiP was also a "plain view" situation. One Oliver Evans
broke into a gas station at 3:00 a.m., awakening an attendant sleeping
there. There was an exchange of shots, and Evans fled to the highway
where a car approached and stopped. Evans tried to get into the car,
the attendant shot at it, and the car sped away leaving Evans behind. The
police took Evans and the gas station attendant to the hospital. The next
morning they went to Evans' rooming house and talked to Virgil, Evans'
roommate. Virgil took them outside and consented to the search of his
car. One of the officers present recalled seeing the car about an hour
before the attempted holdup parked near the gas station. The officers
found nothing incriminating inside the car but spotted what they thought
to be blood on the chrome bolting below the outside door handle. The
police removed the chrome for analysis, and the stains were found to be
human blood. The chrome was admitted in evidence over the objection
of Virgil who protested that the seizure of the evidence was "unreason-
able."
The court, per Justice Huskins, upheld the admissibility of the blood-
stained chrome: "[N] o search warrant was required. The bloodstained
strip of chrome on the exterior of defendant's car was fully disclosed and
open to the naked eye. No search was required to obtain it. It was legally
acquired and properly admitted into evidence."' 7
State v. McClou s involved the search of the interior of a car. Early
on the morning of March 28, 1969, two officers saw an automobile "run
15Id. at 545, 169 S.E.2d at 863.
18276 N.C. 217, 172 S.E2d 28 (1970).
17Id. at 227, 172 S.E.2d at 34.
18276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753 (1970). See note 6 mtpra.
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a red light." They pursued the automobile, which decreased speed, and
the passenger jumped out and ran away. The police arrested the driver
on the charge of running a red light. The officers then looked in the car
and saw on the floorboard two metal flashlights, a metal pry bar, a .22
caliber pistol, a small crowbar, a thirteen inch screwdriver, and a pair of
brown cloth work gloves. The officers again placed the driver under arrest,
this time for the possession of burglary tools and carrying a concealed
weapon. The officers then looked into the glove compartment and found
a chisel, a partially filled bottle of vodka, and a roll of coins wrapped in a
blue container bearing the stamp "Florida Street Baptist Church." At the
subsequent trial, the defendant, who was the passenger, objected to the
admission of the items seized from the car at the time of the arrests.
The court, per Justice Branch, sustained their admissibility. He
wrote that the search of an automobile in connection with a lawful arrest
for a traffic violation is lawful when all the circumstances give rise to a
reasonable belief that the car may contain contraband or other property
lawfully subject to seizure. Here, he concluded:
the owner of the automobile was lawfully under arrest. . . . [Tihe
contraband articles were observed, without the necessity of search, lying
on the floorboard of the automobile. Upon observing these articles,
defendant was further charged with unlawful possession of burglary
tools.... The further search [of the glove compartment] was clearly
based upon a belief reasonably arising from the circumstances that
the motor vehicle contained other property subject to lawful seizure.19
The most interesting decision in this particular area of the law is State
v. Accor.20 In the early morning hours of March 5, 1969, two men broke
into the kitchen of the Martin house in Gastonia. They woke the daughter,
who screamed loudly, and Mr. Martin, age seventy-five, turned on the
kitchen light and made at the two with a vanity stool. The daughter began
to pound one of them with a telephone, and a son joined in the fray. The
melee continued until a next-door neighbor turned on his flood light, and
the intruders fled.
The next day Accor was taken to the police station and photographed,
and the photograph was put into an album with other pictures and shown
to the Martins. The Martins identified Accor's picture, and he was
'" Id. at 530, 173 S.E.2d at 762. The law of search and seizure of automobiles is
admittedly very complicated. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
'-'277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970).
[Vol. 49
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arrested. At the subsequent trial, the album was placed into evidence
over Accor's objection. The supreme court, per Chief Justice Bobbitt,
ruled that the admission of the album was prejudicial error.
The court pointed out that when Accor was picked up, brought in,
and photographed, no warrant had been issued for his arrest, the police
had no evidence to support a finding of probable cause of his guilt, nor
was there any evidence that he voluntarily accompanied the officers
to the police station. As a consequence, the arrest or detention was illegal,
and the subsequent photographs were the "fruit" of the illegality and
"tainted" thereby.
The court relied upon and quoted at length from the recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court, Davis v. Mississippi,"' in which Mr.
Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he exclusionary rule was fashioned as
a sanction to redress and deter overreaching governmental conduct pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment"' and that the exclusionary rule must
apply during an investigatory detention. Otherwise,
[i]nvestigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent
persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary de-
tention. Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was
meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our
citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed "arrests" or investigatory
detentions.3
III. USE OF CONFESSIONS
The problems of confessions, and their admissibility into evidence,
are, in some instances, closely related to the problems of arrest and illegal
search. The Supreme Court held long ago that, in a federal prosecution,
the fourth amendment barred as "fruit of a poison tree" evidence secured
through an illegal search and seizure.24 In 1960, this exclusionary rule
21 394 U.S. 721 (1969). In Davis a young Negro was taken to the police station
and fingerprinted along with a number of other young Negroes. There was no
reason to believe that any of them were guilty of a rape then being investigated.
Subsequently, the fingerprints of Davis were matched with fingerprints found within
the house of the rape victim, and the fingerprint testimony was utilized in the trial
against Davis. The Supreme Court held that the taking of Davis' fingerprints dur-
ing his illegal detention constituted an unreasonable seizure of his person in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment, and notwithstanding its relevancy and trustworthiness
as an item of proof, the illegally seized evidence was inadmissible at trial.
"Id. at 724.
"Id. at 727, cited in State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 82, 175 S.E.2d 583, 594
(1970).
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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was made applicable to the states,2" and in Wong Sun v. United States,28
the Supreme Court extended the "poison fruit" doctrine to verbal state-
ments derived "immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized
arrest."
27
The Wong Sun principle was applied in two cases during the period
covered by this survey, and in each case the holding was against the
accused. In State v. Moore"' the defendant was arrested on the charge of
malicious damage to property. He confessed to the arresting officer that
he had broken windows at a grocery store during a riot in Wilson. The
arrest was illegal since the offense was a misdemeanor and the arresting
officer had no warrant and the offense had not been committed in his
presence.29 Consequently, Moore argued that the confession should not
have been admitted at his trial.
The court, per Justice Branch, rejected this contention and pointed
out that there are two distinct lines of authority under the Wong Sun
decision. One line of authority holds that any confession made sub-
sequent to an illegal arrest must be excluded. The other line of authority
holds that the confession is admissible unless it was caused by, brought
about by, or is the fruit of the police illegality. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court condemned any illegal act by police officers but adopted the
line of authority requiring causation before a confession will be rejected
because of an illegal arrest:
Both reason and weight of authority lead us to hold that every state-
ment made by a person in custody as a result of an illegal arrest is not
ipso facto involuntary and inadmissible, but the facts and circumstances
surrounding such arrest and the in-custody statement should be con-
sidered in determining whether the statement is voluntary and ad-
missible. Voluntariness remains as the test of admissibility. 0
Applying that test to the facts before it, the court concluded that the
confession was made freely, voluntarily, and understandingly.
State v. McCloud3 l was the second case under the Wong Sun doc-
trine. In McCloud the police illegally broke into the defendant's motel
25Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
26371 U.S. 471 (1963).
2 Id. at 485.
2" 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969).
2' See text at note 8 supra.
20 State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 153, 166 S.E.2d 53, 62 (1969).
2276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753 (1970).
[Vol. 49
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room without a warrante2 and illegally seized some incriminating coins.
Defendant then confessed. When the police sought to introduce his con-
fession into evidence, the defendant objected that the illegal entry and
illegal seizure of the coins triggered his confession.
The court, per Justice Branch, rejected this argument and found
that the illegal police conduct did not cause the confession. The court
pointed out that the defendant was a "knowledgeable person, a veteran
of many trials and encounters with the police ' 3 and concluded, therefore,
that the confession was not the "fruit" of the illegally seized coins or the
"product of a 'will overborne.' ""
During the period covered by this survey, the North Carolina Supreme
Court had the interesting problem of whether a confession illegally ob-
tained could be used as evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony
rather than as evidence to prove the crime-in-chief. 5
In State v. Catretta" the owner of a summer mountain cottage arrived
one afternoon to observe some of his furniture on the front yard and a
man coming out of a cottage window with two frying plans. A red and
white Chevrolet was parked in the driveway with a man in the driver's seat.
The man coming out of the window walked down the road, and the
man in the car drove off. The cottage owner summoned the police, and,
as they arrived, the red and white car drove back by the cottage. A police-
man arrested the driver (Catrett). At the trial the policeman testified that
at the time of the arrest, Catrett was "about as drunk a man as you see
out and still going.""7 The policeman further testified that he advised
Catrett of his constitutional rights and that, thereafter, Catrett confessed
to the crime.
Catrett was indicted for aiding and abetting in the felonious breaking
and entering of the cottage. The state did not introduce the confession
during its case. Consequently, the trial judge made no findings that the
confession was voluntarily and understandingly given. When the state
rested, Catrett took the stand and denied that he had been near the cottage
at the time of the crime. The state then put on the arresting officer who
testified concerning the confession. The trial judge admitted this testi-
mony for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant's testimony.
22 See text at note 6 supra.
State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 529, 173 S.E.2d 753, 761 (1970).
2
,Id. at 530,173 S.E.2d at 761.
State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970).
30 Id.
"T Id. at 89, 171 S.E.2d at 400.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed,"s basing its decision
on Walder v. United States.89 Walder had been indicted in 1950 on a
narcotics violation, but the indictment was dismissed because the narcotics
in his possession were illegally seized. In 1952, Walder was again in-
dicted on a narcotics violation, and this time he was brought to trial.
He took the stand and on direct examination denied that he had then,
or ever, been in possession of narcotics. The government then introduced
testimony concerning the prior indictment. The Supreme Court of the
United States upheld this evidence for the purpose of impeachment.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Bobbitt, re-
versed40 the court of appeals and distinguished Walder from Catrett in
that the impeachment testimony in Walder did not relate to the particular
offense for which the defendant was then on trial, whereas it did in
Catrett. More importantly, Justice Bobbitt noted that since Walder the
United States Supreme Court had ruled in Miranda v. Arizona" that a
warning of constitutional rights is a prerequisite to the admission of any
statement made by the defendant. Chief Justice Bobbitt concluded that
in-custody statements attributed to a defendant, when offered by the
State and objected to by the defendant, are inadmissible for any pur-
pose unless after a voir dire hearing in the absence of a jury, the court,
based upon sufficient evidence, makes factual findings that such state-
ments were voluntarily and understandingly made by the defendant after
he had been fully advised as to his constitutional rights.42
Most of the "confession" cases during the period covered by this survey
centered around Miranda v. Arizona48 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that a confession was inadmissible unless the accused was given
a four-fold warning: that he has a right to remain silent; that any state-
ment he does make may be used as evidence against him; that he has the
right to consult with an attorney; and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will
be appointed to represent him. Shortly after Miranda was decided, the
Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. New Jersey,44 that the Miranda
rule was not applicable to defendants whose trial began prior to the date
'8 State v. Catrett, 5 N.C. App. 722, 169 S.E.2d 248 (1969).
347 U.S. 62 (1954).
'" State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 97, 171 S.E.2d 398, 405 (1970) (emphasis in
the original).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"384 U.S. 719 (1966).
[Vol. 49
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of the Miranda decision, and in Jenkins v. Delaware45 the Supreme Court
held that the Miranda rule did not apply to the retrial of defendants after
the date of the Miranda decision if the original trial was prior to that
date. The Supreme Court refused to apply Miranda retroactively (or
prospectively to retrials when the confession evidence had been obtained
prior to Miranda) to prevent unreasonable disruption of the administration
of criminal laws and to avoid "penalizing" the law enforcement officials
who complied with the "constitutional standards applicable at the time
the confessions were made.
46
An interesting application of the retroactive-prospective application of
Miranda came before the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Swann 7 Swann was arrested on a murder charge and confessed to the
crime. The confession was given prior to the decision in Miranda, and,
admittedly, Swann had not been advised of his right to counsel. Swann
was sent to Cherry Hospital for psychiatric observation, and the psychi-
atrists advised that Swann was not then able to stand trial. Two years
later, in 1966, he was judged able to stand trial and was tried. The jury
was unable to reach a verdict. He was tried a second time in 1967 and
found guilty. On post-conviction proceedings he was ordered released
because of "systematic exclusion of Negroes because of race from service
on the grand jury which returned the bill of indictment aginst defendant
at June 1964 Criminal Session in Durham County."4"
Swann was then arrested on a new murder warrant, and a new grand
jury returned an indictment. He was tried on this new indictment in 1968,
and the confession given in 1964 was used against him. The jury was
unable to agree, and a second trial was held on the new indictment in
1968. In that trial, the judge withdrew a juror for reasons not stated in
the record, thus bringing about a mistrial. Swann was tried for a third
time on the new indictment in January, 1969 and found guilty. The pre-
Miranda confession was again admitted at the trial. The supreme court,
per Chief Justice Bobbitt, reversed the conviction on the theory that since
this was a "new trial" (on a new indictment) and since it took place after
the June 13, 1966 date of Miranda, the pre-Miranda confession was im-
properly admitted into evidence.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that after an accused is given the
" 395 U.S. 213 (1969).
" State v. Lewis, 274 N.C. 438, 451, 164 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1968).
'1275 N.C. 644, 170 S.E.2d 611 (1969).
8 Id. at 646, 170 S.E.2d at 612.
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four-fold warning, he may waive his rights to silence and confess to the
crime "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligent-
ly.""9 The Supreme Court added, however, that when a confession is
obtained while the suspect is in custody and/or in isolated circumstances,
"a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel."5 0 The Court explicitly
held that "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of
the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a con-
fession was in fact eventually obtained"51 and that "[t] he requirement of
warnings and waiver of rights is fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing
methods of interrogation.' '52
Most of the "confession" cases arise when the state seeks to admit a
confession and the defendant repudiates it with the statement that it was
not made at all, or at least not made voluntarily, knowingly, and in-
telligently.
The North Carolina Supreme Court insists that the trial judges hold
voir dire hearings out of the presence of the jury and make findings of fact
as to the immediate circumstances and conditions surrounding the making
of the purported confession when objection is made to the admissibility
of a confession. If objection is not made, the trial judge need not conduct
the hearing. State v. Williams" is an unsual "waiver" case which illus-
trates the necessity that the demand for a hearing be made.
Williams was arrested and charged with first degree murder. His
attorney moved the court for a psychiatric examination, and Williams was
sent to the state hospital for observation. The doctors reported that he
could distinguish between right and wrong and was able to assist in his
own defense. When his case was called for trial, he refused to come into
the courtroom, remaining in his cell wrapped in a blanket, apparently
nude. He was then examined by a psychiatrist, who reported to the judge
that Williams was not insane. Williams came into the courtroom when
his case was recalled the same afternoon and told the court that he did
not want a lawyer. The trial judge ultimately agreed but said that he
49 384 U.S. at 444.
50 Id. at 475.
5Id.
2 Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
52276 N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503 (1970).
[Vol. 49
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would ask the attorney previously representing Williams to remain in the
courtroom to give Williams any advice he wished. During the trial,
Williams did not ask the attorney for advice, nor did he cross-examine
any witnesses, put on an affirmative defense, speak to the jury, or other-
wise try to defend himself.
The state introduced agents from the State Bureau of Investigation
who testified in part that they had interviewed Williams after fully
advising him of his constitutional rights and that Williams had given
a detailed confession of the crime. They then recounted the confession.
When the trial ended, the jury found Williams guilty and sentenced him
to death.
Williams announced in open court that he did not wish to appeal.
His previous attorney, however, was permitted to appeal on his behalf
and argued, in part, that the trial judge erred in permitting the State
Bureau of Investigation agents to recount the details of the Williams
confession without first conducting a voir dire investigation to determine
if the confession had been freely and knowingly made. The court, per
Justice Moore, rejected this argument and held that there was no obliga-
tion on the trial court in the absence of an objection to inquire sua sponte
into the voluntariness of an alleged confession offered by the state. The
court noted that "there is nothing in this record to indicate that the con-
fession was anything less than voluntary" and concluded that "no voir
dire is necessary unless there is an objection to the testimony concerning
the alleged confession.""
But if objection is made, it is error for the trial court to fail to hold
the voir dire hearings. This was pointed out in State v. Williford.55
However, if such a hearing is held, the court seems to be inclined to uphold
findings that confessions are voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
made even when, to a more suspicious examiner of the facts, it might
appear that the Miranda warnings were "simply a preliminary ritual to
existing methods of interrogation." For example, in Williford, the
defendant-who was shot in the leg during the holdup of an ABC store
in Raleigh and who, after being arrested and while in great pain, con-
fessed to the crime-saw his confession admitted by the trial court and
his conviction upheld by the supreme court because "a confession is not,
5" Id. at 710, 174 S.E.2d at 508. The court noted that the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965),
had, at least in dictum, reached an opposite conclusion.
- 275 N.C. 575, 169 S.E.2d 851 (1969).
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ipso facto, rendered involuntary because defendant was suffering from
physical injuries and resulting pain." 56
In State v. Murry," a sixteen year old black was arrested on charges
of rape and taken to the sheriff's office in Lumberton where he was
warned of his rights to silence and to counsel. He then confessed. At trial,
the defendant sought to suppress the confession because of his youth, his
eighth grade education, and the fact that he gave the confession in the
sheriff's office with four police officials present and other officers in the
"outside" office. The supreme court, per Chief Justice Bobbitt, rejected
this contention and upheld the sentence of life imprisonment because
"[t] he mere fact that a confession was made while the defendant was in
custody of police officers . . . and before employment of counsel to repre-
sent him, does not, of itself, render it incompetent." 8
Similarly, in State v. Hill,"9 it was argued that the court should reject
the murder confession of a seventeen year old black girl because of her
youth, her lack of opportunity, and her tragic family life and because the
record showed that she did not understand the implications of a confession.
The supreme court, per Justice Higgins, rejected this argument and
sustained the death sentence with the holding that "[i] t would seem that
one who has arrived at the age and condition of accountability for crime
may make a valid waiver of counsel, and make a voluntary confession."6 0
In like vein, the supreme court has sustained the admission of an
in-custody confession when the defendant argued that it was not "in-
telligently" made because "no one explained the doctrine of 'felony-
murder' to him,"'" when the defendant argued that it was not "in-
telligently" made because "he had been drinking heavily and taking drugs
and 'yellow jackets,' "62 and when the defendant argued that his con-
fession of killing two policemen was not "voluntarily" made because it
was given in the police station with many officers present and "before he
was questioned he heard officers outside the room in which he was sitting
make the statements, 'We got a black boy we are fixing to lynch,' and 'Let
Id. at 580. 169 S.E.2d at 855.
6'277 N.C. 197, 176 S.E.2d 738 (1970).
Id. at 204, 176 S.E.2d at 743, citing State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 78, 150 S.E.2d 1,
8 (1966).
1'276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E.2d 885 (1969).
60 Id. at 14, 170 S.E.2d at 894.
" State v. McRae, 276 N.C. 308, 312, 172 S.E.2d 37, 39 (1970).
"2 State v. Haynes, 276 N.C. 150, 171 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1970).
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us have him and take him and let him have an accident with a black-
jack.' ,,63
In many state cases prior to Miranda, the defendant would repudiate
a confession because it had been coerced. The police would deny coercion,
and it was up to the state courts to determine whether the defendant or
the police were telling the truth. Since no one knew to a certainty what
actually went on in the police interrogation rooms, Miranda required
that the defendant be informed of his right to counsel, the expectation
being that counsel would be requested and could then testify to the
veracity of the witnesses. But in North Carolina this expectation has
not come to pass. In all the "capital" cases during the period of this
survey, there was no request for counsel although police say they gave
the Miranda warnings in each instance. The defendants in these cases
have denied this assertion, and, thus, there has been created a new type
of credibility issue: did or did not the police give the required constitutional
warning?
This problem did not arise in State v. McRaed because the defendant
there was given the warnings and had signed a written waiver in the
presence of the deputy clerk of the superior court before any questioning
took place.
The problem does not arise in the federal courts, for the Supreme
Court has held for many years that a confession is not admissible into
evidence unless the arrested suspect is taken "without delay" to a magis-
trate who informs him of his rights to silence, counsel, and so on.65 This
precludes the opportunity for detained questioning and coerced con-
fessions.
The federal "Mallory" exclusionary doctrine is based upon the
requirements of rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and is not a constitutional limitation binding upon the state courts.68
But there is nothing to prevent North Carolina courts from adopting
a similar exclusionary rule to vitalize the North Carolina constitutional and
statutory provisions which, like rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules, require that
all person put under arrest be taken to a magistrate "as soon as may be."' 7
" State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 611, 174 S.E.2d 487, 497 (1970).
'276 N.C. 308, 172 S.E.2d 37 (1970).
"Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
" Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
" .C. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 14, 17, 18; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46 (1965); N.C. GN.
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It would minimize the questions which now arise when defendants seek to
repudiate their confessions with the assertion that they were not given the
Miranda warnings.
IV. LINE-UP, PHOTOGRAPH, AND IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
The cases involving identification of the accused by the victim during
a criminal trial share some of the due process attributes of the cases
dealing with "coerced confessions" and illegally obtained evidence.
In United States v. Wade"' the United States Supreme Court held
that a "line-up" identification procedure is a "critical stage" of the
criminal trial and that, consequently, a suspect is entitled to the assistance
of counsel to ensure that the line-up is conducted fairly. The Court also
applied the "exclusionary rules" so that any information gained by the
state at a line-up cannot be used against the accused unless he has
counsel with him at the line-up or has intelligently and knowingly waived
his right to the assistance of counsel. The Court acknowledged, however,
that if an in-court identification has an origin independent of the line-up
information and is, thus, not tainted by the illegal line-up, it is admissible.
In Stoval v. Denno69 the United States Supreme Court, while ruling
that the Wade requirement of counsel at line-ups would not be given retro-
active application, acknowledged that a line-up procedure may be "so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identi-
fication"70 as to be a denial of due process apart from the right-to-counsel
rule. Foster v. California7 illustrates this last principle. In that case a
holdup victim identified the culprit as a tall man wearing a leather jacket.
Foster, six feet tall and wearing a leather jacket, was put in a three-man
line-up with two short men, and the victim picked him out as the robber.
The Supreme Court held that "[T]his procedure so undermined the
reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due process.1"72
Finally, in Simmons v. United States73 victims of a robbery identified
the defendant from photographs shown to them by the police. The
STAT. § 15-47 (Supp. 1969). See aLo State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 531, 173
S.E.2d 753, 762 (1970); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 146, 166 S.E.2d 53, 57(1969).
68388 U.S. 218 (1967).
,° 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
O Id. at 302.
'11394 U.S. 440 (1969).
7Id. at 443.
7- 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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Supreme Court upheld the conviction under the facts in that case, but
warned that:
convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pre-
trial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground
[due process] . . .if the photographic identification procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very susbtantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification .... 7-
During the period covered by this survey, the North Carolina
Supreme Court passed on seven situations involving alleged impermissibly
suggestive line-ups and suggestive photographs.
State v. Rogers5 concerned a rape, during evening hours, along an
unlighted stretch of a city block. The victim, even though "visibility was
poor," told the police than her assailant "was a young colored male with
smooth skin, hair cut short, dressed in a dark blue jacket and dark pants
and had a men's leather belt looped loosely and hanging around his
neck. ' 7 ' The police rounded up four suspects, all fourteen or fifteen years
of age, with one, Rogers, wearing a belt hanging around his neck. The
victim asked that Rogers put on a dark blue jacket, and when he did,
she identified him as her assailant. At the subsequent trial, she testified
to the jury that she had identified Rogers at the line-up, and she made an
additional in-court identification. Rogers was convicted and given a life
sentence.
On appeal, he argued that he was the victim of a suggestive line-up
procedure. The supreme court, per Justice Huskins, pointed out that
the line-up took place prior to the Wade decision, and, therefore, the
requirement of counsel did not apply. It also held that there was no denial
of due process:
The belt around defendant's neck was the only mark of identification
peculiar to him alone. It was placed there by defendant himself-not
by law enforcement authorities. The officers were under no compulsion,
constitutional or otherwise, to remove it. Nor were they required to
place similar belts around the necks of the other boys in the lineup. Its
presence cannot be attributed to the officers or regarded as the kind
of rigged "suggestiveness" in identification procedures which Wade
and Gilbert and Foster were designed to deter. Its presence was simply
an existing fact-it was around defendant's neck when he was picked
71Id. at 384.
" 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969).
,0 Id. at 416, 168 S.E.2d at 347.
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up, there when he was taken to the police station, and still there when
viewed by the victim. No one put the belt on him and no one asked
him to remove it. The victim was permitted to see him in rainment
of his own choosing. Considering the totality of circumstances, as we
are required to do, we hold that the lineup in this case did not offend
constitutional requirements .... 77
State v. Gatling78 involved a robbery. The victim was hitchhiking
near the main gate of Camp Lejeune where he was picked up "by two
colored men wearing marine utility clothes and driving an old model,
white, two door Pontiac. 7 9 They drove him around, robbed him, and
threw him out in a lonely area. He reported the crime to the police and
gave them a description of the car and the license-plate number. The car
was spotted soon thereafter. Gatling was in the driver's seat with a
friend next to him. They were taken to the police staiton where the
victim was waiting. He "positively identified Gatling and Banks as the
men who robbed him."' 0 He so testified at the trial, and over the objections
of the defendants, made in-court identifications.
Gatling protested that he had not had the assistance of counsel at
the line-up at the police station, but the court, per Justice Huskins, re-
jected this contention on the theory that the Wade decision did not apply:
there was no lineup; nor were defendants "shown singly" for identifica-
tion purposes. They were taken to the jail for incarceration-not for
identification. Russell's [the victim's] presence there was not pre-
arranged by the officers. He had remained there of his own volition
after reporting the robbery .... This is a far cry from the facts in
Wade and Gilbert and certainly is not the type of confrontation for
identification purposes which those cases were designed to deter. In our
view Wade and Gilbert do not encompass and have no application to the
facts in this case.81
Apart from the requirements of counsel at a line-up, the court also
held that "the victim's identification of defendants at the jail did not take
7 Id. at 429, 168 S.E.2d at 356. There was evidence in this case that Rogers was
a member of the "Hunt Street Angels" and that many members of this street club
wore belts around their necks at times.
78 275 N.C. 625, 170 S.E.2d 593 (1969).
" Id. at 626, 170 S.E.2d at 593.
8 Id. at 628, 170 S.E.2d at 594. Gatling had an alibi at the trial-that he was on
duty at the Marine Base until 4:00 p.m. on the day of the robbery-and the senior
noncommissioned officer and several others backed him up. They were not sure,
however, whether it was 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, or daylight savings time.
811 d. at 632-33, 170 S.E.2d at 597.
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place under circumstances 'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification' as to be a denial of due process of
law"8' under the principles expounded in Stoval. State v. Austi s3 was
a much simpler situation. Two armed men held up a store. They were
not masked, and one was a customer known to the victim. Ten days
or so after the robbery, the victim was shown a number of pictures and
identified the two robbers. At the trial, he made an in-court identification.
The supreme court, per Justice Huskins, affirmed the conviction on
the theory that "[e]ven if Wade and Gilbert applied in this case ... [the
in-court identification] was in no way related to the lineup.' 8' The court
explained that the prosecuting witness had observed both defendants from
eight to ten minutes during the robbery, that the defendants were un-
disguised, and that their actual description fits the description the victim
gave the officers following the robbery.
State v. Blackwell85 was more complicated. Fannie Dillard went to
a "drink house" in Winston-Salem late one night to get a drink of wine.
After several drinks she said "Oh, I wish Sonny was here to walk me
home."8.. A stranger said he would walk her home and put his arm around
her waist. She testified that on the way home, the stranger raped her.
She identified Blackwell as the stranger; he was convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment.
When the victim had reported the crime to the police, they presented
her with fifteen or twenty photographs, and she picked defendant's photo-
graph from the others. The police arrested him and brought him to the
police station where he was confronted with the victim. She asked the
police "to ask him to embrace me around my waist ... to see how near I
come to his shoulder '"sT and then identified him although since the rape
"[h] e had cut and shaved his hair off, and he had a white earring in his
ear." 8 Defendant objected that the "vital in-court identification by the
prosecution witness was tainted by illegal out-of-court identification,"8' 9
but the court, per Justice Branch, held that the record:
82 Id. at 633, 170 S.E.2d at 597-98.
Ra276 N.C. 391, 172 S.E.2d 507 (1970).
"Id. at 397, 172 S.E.2d at 511.
"276 N.C. 714, 174 S.E.2d 534 (1970).
"Id. at 716, 174 S.E.2d at 536.
87 Id. at 718, 174 S.E.2d at 537.
88 Id. at 719, 174 S.E.2d at 537.
88 Id. at 719, 174 S.E.2d at 538.
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clearly establishes that the in-court identification was based upon ob-
servation of the suspect immediately before and at the time the crime
was committed, so that the in-court identification was of independent
origin and untainted by any illegality in the identification by photograph
or the in-custody confrontation. 90
State v. Accor9 ' also involved the use of photographs. Two burglars
were apprehended during a burglary, but they escaped after a scuffle with
the home occupants. Accor and another were suspected by the police; they
were photographed; and their pictures put in an album with the photo-
graphs "of eleven other adult Negro males."9 2 The album was shown to
each of the home occupants in private, and they identified Accor as one
of the burglars. At trial, the victims made in-court identifications. De-
fendant objected that "the photographic identifications were illegal because
there was a 'lineup in disguise' when counsel for defendants were not
present."9 " The court, per Chief Justice Bobbitt, rejected this contention
with the holding that:
In our view, the doctrine of Wade and Gilbert should not be
extended to out-of-court examinations of photographs including that of
a s=spect, whether the suspect be at liberty or in custody. We shall
adhere to this view unless and until the Supreme Court of the United
States enunciates such an extension of the Wade and Gilbert doctrine. 4
State v. Jacobs5 is the final photograph case. A rape victim identified
her assailant and the make and license number of his automobile. This led
the police to Jacobs, an Indian, and they took two color pictures of him.
They gave these two pictures, along with ten other "black and white"
pictures of white men, to the victim, and she identified Jacobs. Each
picture was marked on its face with the date on which it was taken.
The victim did not know at that time that the assailant was an Indian
and had described him to the police as a "white person." Jacobs objected
that the photographic identification procedure was "so impermissibly sug-
gestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification" under Simmons v. United States.0 The Supreme
Court, per Justice Branch, held that if the procedure was in error, it was
90 Id. at 724, 174 S.E.2d at 541.
"'277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970).
"Id. at 69, 175 S.E.2d at 586.
Id. at 78, 175 S.E.2d at 591.
,Id. at 80-81, 175 S.E.2d at 593 (emphasis in the original). The supreme court
reversed for other reasons. See text at note 20 supra.
2277 N.C. 151, 176 S.E.2d 744 (1970).
"390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
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not prejudicial error, for "[t]he record reveals that the prosecuting wit-
ness had opportunity to observe defendant for a period of about an hour
and a half in a lighted area"19 7 before the rape took place; so the in-court
identification was a case of "independent origin" and was, therefore, un-
tainted by any illegality in the pre-trial identification by photograph.
State v. McNeil" is another rape case. A fifteen year old girl was
attacked by a stranger on her way home from school. Two young boys
happened by and threw a stick into the bushes where the assault was taking
place. The assailant ran and was recognized by the young boys. They
identified him to the police. Two policemen took him to the school the
next day. One held him outside on the school yard, and the other went in
and led the victim to the window to observe the suspect. She told the
policeman, "That is him."'9 9 At the subsequent trial the victim made an
in-court identification, the victim was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Defendant appealed on the theory that "his constitutional right to a
lawyer was violated by the officers in that they took him to the school
house"'100 for identification. He contended further that his in-court
identification by the victim was "tainted" by the prior identification at
the school house. The court, per Justice Higgins, ruled that there was no
"taint" from the confrontation at the school house and asked rhetorically:
Why should the appellate courts indulge the presumption that the
victim's in-court identification is not reliable and should be excluded
in cases where the witness had made a prior identification, even if the
suspect was in custody? What difference does it make if the identifica-
tion was made while he was in custody, in a line up, or in a rogue's
gallery picture? . . . The main issue is the guilt or innocence of the
suspect. To exclude the evidence of the victim identifying him because
she had previously seen him in the presence of officers is a case of the
tail wagging the dog.1' 1
V. REMOTE AND PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY
Evidence in a criminal trial which only serves to inflame the passions
and prejudices of the jury violates due process of law.10 2 As Professor
State v. Jacobs, 277 N.C. 151, 161, 176 S.E.2d 744, 750 (1970).
"277 N.C. 162, 176 S.E.2d 732 (1970).
"Id. at 167, 176 S.E.2d at 734.200 Id. at 170, 176 S.E.2d 736.
101 Id. at 172, 176 S.E.2d at 738.
""See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 255-56 (1961) ; Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941).
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McCormick points out, even "relevance is not always enough. There may
remain the question, is its value worth what it costs? There are several
counterbalancing factors. . . . In order of their importance, they are
these. First, the danger that the facts offered may unduly arouse the
jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy .... ,,10a
The supreme court has struck this balance between relevance and
prejudice on several recent occasions, usually when the state had intro-
duced evidence of past criminality or misconduct or when the state sought
to illustrate the facts of a crime with pictures that could only serve to
inflame the jurors.
In State v. Williams;04 the defendant was on trial for the rape of a
member of the Women's' Army Corps living with her soldier husband
at Fort Bragg. The defendant confessed to the crime (he later repudiated
the confession) and told the investigating officers that he was then AWOL
from Fort Hood, Texas. He objected when this fact was made known
to the jury. The court, per Justice Bobbitt, held that his "absent-without-
leave" status with the Army "has no significant relationship to whether
he committed the crime for which he was indicted . . . [and that] it
would have been technically correct to strike this particular sentence"' 0 5
from the defendant's prior statement. But the court could not "conceive
that the jurors could have been affected" by this information, so its ad-
mission was not "prejudicial."
In a different State v. Williams,0 6 the defendant was on trial for his
life on a murder charge, and the state introduced a confession which
included the statement that at the time of the crime, the accused was on
"work release," i.e., sentenced to prison but released during the day
to work on the outside. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to
death; his attorney argued that the "work release" evidence was prej-
udicial. The court, per Justice Moore, rejected this contention with these
not altogether unambiguous words:
While it is undoubtedly the rule of law that evidence of a distinct sub-
stantive offense is inadmissible to prove another independent crime,
this rule is subject to well-established exceptions where the two crimes
are disconnected and not related to each other. Proof of the commission
of other like offenses to show a chain of circumstantial evidence with
.08 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152, at 3M9 (1st ed. 1954).
10°275 N.C. 77, 165 S.E.2d 481 (1969).
105 Id. at 89, 165 S.E.2d at 489.
100276 N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503 (1970).
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respect to the matter on trial or to show the identity of the person
charged is competent. The testimony that defendant was on "work
release" was competent as proof of the identity of defendant and as a
fact in the chain of events leading up to the commission of the alleged
crime.107
State v. Moore"0 8 also concerned the admissibility of past misconduct.
Moore, on trial for the murder of his wife, admitted that he had shot her
but claimed that the gun had gone off accidentally when he dropped it on
the floor while reaching for a cigarette. The state introduced evidence
that, in 1965, the "defendant had slapped his wife several times, ... torn
her clothes from her body, and 'snatched her out on the porch by the hair
of her head.' """ In October of that same year, he had beaten her and
torn off her blouse. Just prior to Christmas in 1967, he hit his wife
"in the side with a bottle of whiskey and beat her in the face," ' and, in
1968, he took two gasoline credit cards from her purse, tore them up,
and said that he was going to put a stop to her going so much. The
morning after this occurrence, a neighbor heard the wife give several
screams and, later that afternoon, observed that the wife had a bruised eye
and a cut on her nose. The court held all this evidence "admissible as
bearing on intent, malice, motive, premediation and deliberation on the
part of the prisoner."''
More serious and difficult are the situations where the state introduces
photographs depicting the more sordid and revolting aspects of a crime.
Thus, in State v. Atkinson,"" the defendant was charged with the murder
of his four year old stepdaughter. He confessed to the crime and took
the police to the wooded area where he had buried her. At the trial the
state introduced pictures of the burial area and of the victim. The state
also put into evidence the shovel used by the defendant to dig the grave
and the clothing worn by the child at the time of death. The state also
introduced evidence by a pathologist that the child had been raped prior
to her death (defendant was not not charged with rape) and photographs
of her body to illustrate the brutal nature of the rape. The jury sentenced
the defendant to death.
The court, per Justice Lake, upheld the conviction and sentence.
207Id. at 711-12, 174 S.E.2d at 509 (citations omitted).
1-08 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969).
109 Id. at 203, 166 S.E.2d at 655.
11 Id. at 203, 166 S.E.2d at 656.
"'Id. at 206, 166 S.E.2d at 658.
11275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969).
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[T]he jury was properly instructed that the photographs in question
were allowed in evidence for the sole purpose of illustrating the testi-
mony of the witnesses and not as substantive evidence. The fact that
a photograph depicts a horrible, gruesome and revolting scene . . .
does not render the photograph incompetent in evidence, when properly
authenticated as a correct portrayal of the conditions observed by and
related by the witness .... 11
The photographs substantiating the rape were additionally admissible "to
establish the motive, premeditation, deliberation and malice on the part
of the defendant for and in the murder with which he was charged."1 4
State v. Barrow" 5 also concerned the use of a photograph to illustrate
the fact of death. Barrow was charged with murder. He admitted the
killing but alleged that it was in self-defense. At the trial the state in-
troduced a photograph of the deceased as he lay face down in the doorway
after having been shot three times. This was used to illustrate the
testimony of a bystander as to what had gone on. The court, per Justice
Huskins, ruled that the photograph was admissible because "if a photo-
graph is relevant and material, the fact that it is gory or gruesome, and
thus may tend to arouse prejudice, will not alone render it inadmissible."110
But photographs of the victim will not be admitted in all circum-
stances. Thus, in State v. Mercer,"7 some pictures were admitted, others
rejected. Mercer was estranged from his wife and, in an attempt at
reconcilation, went to the house where she was living with a woman
friend. He thought his wife's relationship with her friend "involved more
than normal affection.""" When he arrived, he was denied admittance;
whereupon, he fired three or four shots into the front bedroom killing his
wife, her friend, and the infant son of the friend. He was charged with
first degree murder for each of the three homicides, and at the trial
photographs were admitted. Four of them showed the bedroom with the
wife's body lying on the bed. The court, per Justice Bobbitt, held that
this evidence was admissible. Four additional pictures showed Ida (the
friend) and Jeffrey (her son) lying dead at the funeral home. The court
held that these photographs "depicting scenes which are poignant and in-
Id. at 311, 167 S.E.2d at 254-55.
Id. at 313, 167 S.E.2d at 256.
1276 N.C. 381, 172 S.E.2d 512 (1970).
1 Id. at 385, 172 S.E.2d at 514, citing D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVI-
DENCE § 34 (2d ed. 1963).
1275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969).
1 8 Id. at 111, 165 S.E.2d at 331.
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flammatory, have no probative value in respect of any issue for the deter-
mination of the jury." '119 The court concluded:
[W]here a prejudicial photograph is relevant, competent and there-
fore admissible, the admission of an excessive number of photographs
depicting substantially the same scene may be sufficient ground for a
new trial when the additional photographs add nothing in the way of
probative value but tend solely to inflame the jurors.12
In State v. Rogerss' there were no photographs, but the accused
in a rape trial objected when the clothing worn by the victim-skirt, bra,
blouse, slip, shoes, and raincoat-was introduced into evidence. The
court, per Justice Huskins, summarily rejected the defendant's con-
tention that this evidence was prejudicial with the comment that "[a] rticles
of clothing identified as worn by the victim at the time the crime was
committed are competent evidence, and their admission has been approved
in many decisions of this Court."' 22
State v. Strickland'2 involved the use of motion pictures as evidence.
On the night of December 1, 1967, a deputy sheriff saw an automobile
run off the road into a tree. He went to the aid of the driver, who
was drunk. The deputy began to direct the traffic, and the driver of the
car left the scene. The car was registered to Strickland, and two hours
later a patrolman went to his home. Strickland was in a very intoxicated
condition. He was taken to the police station, and movies were made of
him as he performed certain tests. Strickland was then charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
He denied the charge, claiming that he had been at home all evening
drinking a beer or two.
The movies were shown to the jury, and Strickland objected on the
grounds of self-incrimination. The court, per Justice Branch, rejected this
challenge because the privilege against self-incrimination relates only
to testimony of communicative acts and does not apply to acts not com-
municative in nature. However, the sound track of the movie projected
the voice of the accused admitting that he had been driving the car on
the evening in question and that he had been drinking. The court held
that this statement was clearly substantive evidence and inadmissible in
1 Id. at 121, 165 S.E.2d at 337.
'120 Id. at 120, 165 S.E.2d at 337.
1"275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969).
- Id. at 430, 168 S.E.2d at 356.
121276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129 (1970).
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the absence of a voir dire hearing to determine whether it was "voluntarily
and understandingly made" by the defendant after he had been advised
of his constitutional rights. As there had been no such voir dire hearing,
the conviction was reversed. However, the court added a general note of
caution concerning movies and their use in trials:
we think it appropriate to observe that the use of properly authenticated
moving pictures to illustrate a witness' testimony may be of invaluable
aid in the jury's search for a verdict that speaks the truth. However,
the powerful impact of this type of evidence requires the trial judge
to examine carefully into its authenticity, relevancy, and competency,
and-if he finds it to be competent-to give the jury proper limiting
instructions at the time it is introduced.' 24
VI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Gideon v. Wainwright,'25 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the right to counsel, guaranteed in the sixth amendment, is made
obligatory upon the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In that case, the Supreme Court made this ruling as to state
felony cases, but it did not say whether the ruling applied to state mis-
demeanor cases.' 26
Following the decision in Gideon, the North Carolina legislature
required the judges of the superior courts in felony cases to advise all
defendants that they were entitled to counsel and to appoint counsel for
each defendant found to be indigent unless the right to counsel was in-
telligently and understandingly waived. Concerning those accused of
misdemeanors, the North Carolina legislature authorized, but did not
require, the judges to appoint counsel for each indigent "if in the opinion
of the judge such appointment [was] warranted."'"
In State v. Morris 28 and in State v. Green,2" the North Carolina
Supreme Court had an opportunity to explicate the situations in which
misdemeanor defendants must be advised of their right to retain counsel,
12 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12' Id. at 262, 173 S.E.2d at 135.
"" The Supreme Court of the United States recently has extended the right of
counsel guaranteed in the sixth amendment to the states via the fourteenth amend-
ment in misdemeanor cases when the punishment may exceed six months in jail or a
fine of five hundred dollars. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
""
7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (1965).
128275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969).
129277 N.C. 188, 76 S.E.2d 756 (1970).
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of their right to have counsel appointed for them if they cannot afford
counsel, and of the possible adverse consequences of standing trial without
counsel.
Morris concerned a charge of operating a motor vehicle upon a public
street while under the the influence of intoxicants. This offense was a
misdemeanor punishable by up to two years imprisonment. Morris was
convicted of this charge and sentenced to eighteen months. On appeal, he
argued that it was error for the trial court not to have advised him of his
right to court-appointed counsel. The supreme court, per Justice Huskins,
agreed and held:
defendant here, who is charged with a serious offense, has a constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel during his trial in the superior
court and ... G.S. 15-4.1, insofar as it purports to leave to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants charged with serious offenses, is unconstitutional. A seri-
ous offense is one for which the authorized punishment exceeds six
months' imprisonment and a $500 fine. 30
In Green, the defendant was charged and found guilty of willful
neglect and refusal to support two named illegitimate children. He was
sentenced to jail for a term of six months, but the sentence was suspended
for two years on condition that he pay into court the sum of ten dollars
per week for the support of the two children. He appealed alleging error
by the trial judge in not making inquiry into his indigency and failing
to afford him counsel.
The court, per Justice Huskins, recited that since the maximum pun-
ishment for willful failure to support illegitimate children was a jail
sentence of six months, this offense was not a "'serious misdemeanor' so
as to require appointment of counsel or intelligent waiver thereof under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion [. ]))-81
In other cases dealing with right to counsel, the supreme court held
that there was no such right under the Wade line-up decision when the
police display an album of photographs to the victims of a crime to
identify a suspect'32 and that "even in capital offenses a defendant may
1"' State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 59, 165 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1969). See note 126
mipra.
"' State v. Green, 277 N.C. 188, 192, 176 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1970).State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970).
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intelligently and understandingly waive counsel during an in-custody
interrogation."' m
VII. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The Supreme Court of North Carolina also clarified the right to trial
by jury. This was necessitated by the decision by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Duncan v. Louisiana." "'
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled upon two claims relating
to the right to jury trial during the period of this survey. In Blue Jeans
Corp. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers,:' 5 some strikers at the White-
ville Manufacturing Company violated a state court injunction against
using "loud, boisterous and insulting language to persons lawfully using
the driveway" of the struck premises "in a willful attempt to intimidate
and harass or insult employees and other persons doing business" with
the corporation." 6 They were tried without a jury and sentenced to fines
of ten dollars or to five days in the county jail. They appealed arguing
that they were denied a jury trial in violation of the federal and state
constitutions.
The court, per Justice Huskins, rejected the contention. Noting that
the maximum punishment permitted under North Carolina General
Statutes sections 5-1 and 5-4 was a fine of 250 dollars or imprisonment for
thirty days or both, the court concluded that "the offense is petty and
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in either federal or state
courts."'13 7
Chief Justice Bobbitt dissented on the theory that article 1, section
13, of the North Carolina Constitution "confers upon every person accused
of having committed a criminal offense, even though it be a petty mis-
demeanor, the right to trial by jury either in the inferior court or in the
superior court upon original trial or trial de novo upon defendant's appeal
from an inferior court. ' '1M
State v. McRae, 276 N.C. 308, 316, 172 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1970).
" 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Supreme Court also has required a trial by jury
in a contempt-of-court situation when the potential punishment is more than
"petty," i.e., more than six months or five hundred dollars. Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 206 (1968). It
has not yet decided the right to trial by jury in a "juvenile" proceeding, although
it has required that many other attributes of "due process" be followed. See, e.g.,
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969).
Id. at 506, 169 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 511, 169 S.E.2d at 872.Id. at 516, 169 S.E.2d at 875 (Bobbitt, C.J. & Sharp, J., dissenting).
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In it re Burrus"'5 the court, per Justice Huskins, held that there
was no right to a jury trial in a delinquency proceeding. There, some
forty school children, all under sixteen, had protested school conditions
at Swans Corner with boisterous marches through the streets, thereby
interfering with the flow of traffic. The district court judge declared that
they were delinquents, ordered them confined to a state institution, and
suspended the order on the conditions that they violate no laws of North
Carolina for twelve months, that they report to the social services depart-
ment at least once each month, that they be home by 11:00 each night,
and that they attend school.140
By way of contrast to the decision in the Burrus case, it should be
noted that if a child is fourteen and charged with a capital offense, the
juvenile courts have no jurisdiction, and the trial in the superior court is
before a jury.141
VIII. RIGHT TO A JURY DRAwN FROM A CROSS-SECTION
OF THE COMMUNITY
The fourteenth amendment requires not only that a criminal defendant
be afforded the right to trial by jury, but also that he have a jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community from which no identifiable
group is systematically and intentionally excluded.'4 In the survey
period, a number of challenges to the composition of the grand or petty
juries were made by litigants and rejected by the North Carolina Supreme
Court.
In State v. Rogers, 43 the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment
on the theory that Negroes were systematically excluded from the grand
jury which indicted him. The supreme court, per Justice Huskins, denied
this motion because "there is no . . .evidence in this record to support"
it.' 44 The fourteen year old Negro youth also moved to dismiss the in-
dictment because nonproperty owners were systematically excluded from
the jury list in Durham County. The record showed that the county
... 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969).
... The court also held that the juvenile is not entitled to a public trial, that
the North Carolina Juvenile Court Act is not unconstitutionally vague, and that
there was no error in preventing an appeal in forma pauperis in these proceedings.
Chief Justice Bobbitt and Justice Sharp dissented without opinion. The Supreme
Court of the United States agreed to review the case. 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).'
' State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 425, 168 S.E.2d 345, 353 (1969).
... Carter v. Jury Coma'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
-- 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969).
I" Id. at 420, 168 S.E.2d at 350.
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commissioners drew the members of the grand jury and the petit jury
from the names on the tax records. The court ruled that this fact "does
not show racial discrimination in the selection of prospective jurors"
and that absent discrimination "by race or other identifiable group," a
state is at liberty "to prescribe such qualifications for jurors as it deems
proper." The court acknowledged that selection of jurors exclusively
from the names on the tax records was in violation of state law but con-
cluded that this "does not affect the legality of the jury; as the provisions
of the state law are 'directory and not mandatory.' 145
In State v. Roseboro146 the sixteen year old Negro youth indicted for
the murder of a white woman moved to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that "members of his economic class and race were arbitrarily
and systematically excluded [from jury service] .'1 The court, per
Justice Higgins, found that the grand jury (drawn from Cleveland
County) was properly constituted and that approximately fifty per cent
of its members were of the defendant's race. The court also found that
the petit jury (drawn from Burke County) was properly constituted.
Approximately six to eight per cent of the total population of Burke
County were members of the defendant's race, and two members of the
"colored race were summoned on the original venire, three on the first
additional venire, and two one [sic] the second additional venire." 148 The
record did not show how many veniremen reported in obedience to the
writs. Members of the "colored race were passed by the court as
qualified," '49 but removed by preemptory challenge by the state. How-
ever, the court still held that "the jury selection conformed to the pattern
approved by both State and Federal decisions."' 0
In State v. Spencer4 a number of black civil rights demonstrators
were charged with obstructing the highway. Prior to trial, defense
counsel moved to quash the jury venire and indicated a desire to make
a showing on the motion. The trial judge indicated a willingness to hear
evidence but said he would not delay the trial. The attorney then showed
that of the total jurors present on the regular jury panel, fifty-four were
Id. at 422-24, 168 S.E.2d at 351-52.
276 N.C. 185, 171 S.E.2d 886 (1970).
'"lId. at 189, 171 S.E.2d at 888.
1,8 Id. at 193, 171 S.E.2d at 891.
19 Id.
"so Id.276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970).
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white and twenty were Negro. The supreme court, per Justice Huskins,
held that this showing was inadequate to prove the denial of constitutional
rights and that it was not error for the trial judge not to delay the trial
since the defense counsel has been retained some four months earlier and
had had ample time to make out a case if a case could be made out.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois 52 a defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death by an Illinois jury from which all prospective jurors
who voiced sentiment against the death sentence had been culled. The
defendant argued that this resulted in the systematic exclusion of an
identifiable segment of the community. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that there was no evidence that a "death prone" jury could not
fairly determine the issues of guilt or innocence, but that a "sentence of
death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it
was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty.115
In State v. Williams'54 the defendants had been found guilty of rape
and sentenced to life imprisonment. They argued that their convictions
and sentences were unconstitutional because the trial court excluded jurors
who voiced a personal conviction against capital punishment. The supreme
court, per Chief Justice Bobbitt, affirmed the conviction and sentence be-
cause Witherspoon only applies when the death sentence is given and be-
cause there was no greater evidence here than in Witherspoon that a
"death-qualified" jury is "necessarily . .. biased .. .with respect to a
defendant's guilt."' 5 5
In "death sentence" cases, the supreme court followed Witherspoon
by reversing convictions when, as in State v. Ruth, 56 jurors were ex-
cluded who "stated simply a general objection to or conscientious scruples
against the infliction of capital punishment"'M5 and by affirming the con-
victions when-as in State v. Atkinson,5 8 State v. Sanders,5 and State
v. Miller'6 -- the excluded jurors made it clear that they would not return
a death verdict whatever the evidence might be.
152391 U.S. 510 (1968).158 Id. at 521-23.
1275 N.C. 77, 165 S.E.2d 481 (1969).
Id. at 85, 165 S.E.2d at 486.1-- 276 N.C. 36, 170 S.E.2d 897 (1969).
157 Id. at 40, 170 S.E.2d at 899.
18275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969).
1°9276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970).
276 N.C. 681, 174 S.E.2d 481 (1970).
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IX. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The United States and the North Carolina Constitutions prohibit
"cruel and unsual" punishments, and in a number of cases during the
period of this survey, it was argued that certain penalties were cruel, un-
usual, and disproportionate to the crime charged. Thus, in State v.
Rogers""' it was argued that the possibility of a death penalty is cruel
and unusual when applied to a fourteen year old boy charged with rape;
in State v. Benton '6 it was argued to be cruel and unsual to sentence an
accessory to second degree murder to life imprisonment; in State v.
Accori 6 3 it was argued that it was cruel and unusual to subject to the
death penalty a man charged with burglary in the first degree; in State
v. Hil&'64 it was contended that it was cruel and unusual to convict a
seventeen year old girl to death for murder, especially when she was of
low intelligence and from a broken home; and in State v. Roseboro'05 the
argument was made that it was cruel and unusual to sentence a sixteen
year old boy to death for murder.
These contentions were rejected, generally on the theory that the court
"has neither the power to change the law nor to remit the penalty the law
exacts after conviction.... [A]ppeals for changes in the law should be
made to the Legislature; appeals for relief from its penalties after con-
viction should be made to the Governor."16
The federal courts, ever since Marbury v. Madison,1 7 have been more
inclihed toward exercising the powers of judicial review when a statute is
attacked on constitutional grounds. When eighth amendment "cruel and
unusual punishment" issues are raised, the Supreme Court measures the
statute and 'punishment against the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." '  By close decisions, the Court
has' sustained the second electrocution of a Louisiana prisoner after the
first effort proved abortive," 9 nullified a California law permitting the
imprisonment of persons "addicted to the use of narcotics,"'170 and
101275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969).
102276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793 (1970).
100277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970).
%-'276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E.2d 885 (1969).
1" 276 N.C. 185, 171 S.E.2d 886 (1970).
16 Id. at 197, 171 S.E.2d at 894.
107 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1 00Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
100 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
1' Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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sustained a Texas law authorizing the imprisonment of chronic alcoholics
who appear drunk in public. 1 '
The Supreme Court has so far refused to review the constitutionality
of a death penalty for rape when the rapist has neither taken nor en-
dangered human life.' 2 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently decided this issue 78 and held that the death penalty in
these circumstances was "cruel and unusual," hence, unconstitutional.
In that case, a Negro named William Ralph broke into a Montgomery
County, Maryland, home and threatened the victim and her young son with
death unless she submitted to him. A subsequent physician's examination
of the woman showed no outward evidence of injury or violence, nor any
signs of unsual psychological trauma. Ralph was convicted and sentenced
to death. Judge Butzner, for a unanimous three judge panel, reversed the
sentence and sent the case back for the imposition of a lesser penalty.
The court ruled that capital punishment for a rape under these cir-
cumstances is "so disproportionate that, in fact, it has been widely
rejected." Judge Butzner cited data showing that the United States is
one of four nations in which a rape conviction is punishable by death (the
others are Malawi, Nationalist China, and the Union of South Africa) arid
that within the United States, more than two-thirds of the states and
Congress "consider the death penalty to be an excessive punishment for
the crime of rape."
The court concluded that the death penalty for rape is not only "un-
usual," but also "cruel" and that the infrequency of its imposition
indicates that "it is meted out arbitrarily."'7 4
Other Issues Centering Around the Death Penalty
The quality of justice within a state is often measured by the official
treatment toward those charged with the more repulsive and brutal crimes,
i.e., the capital offenses. It is not amiss then to discuss two other current
issues centering around the imposition of the death penalty.
Traditionally, attacks against capital punishment emphasize that the
death penalty is cruel and unsual 75 and that it is applied on a selective
--i.e., racial-basisY.7 6 A more recent attack on the death penalty argues
1
"' Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1967)
" Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 899 (1963).
... Ralph v. Warden, 39 U.S.L.W. 2330 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 1970).
17, Id. at 2331.
. See text at notes 151-55 supra.
... See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 422, 168 S.E.2d 345, 351 (1969).
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that the state laws that give juries unbridled discretion to impose the death
penalty or, alternatively, to recommend life imprisonment are void under
the due process clause because they suffer the "vice of vagueness."
A second argument recently advanced against the death penalty is that
the system whereby a single jury both determines guilt and imposes
sentence is a denial of important trial rights.' 7  The rationale advanced
is that an accused may have a good case to put before the jury in con-
nection with the sentence, e.g., a psychotic or psychopathic personality
resulting in numerous anti-social activities, but he is hesitant to put this
case before the same jury which determines guilt. Consequently, he is
deterred from taking the witness stand in a "single jury" process. He
argues that due process requires that he be given a "bifurcated trial,"
i.e., a trial before one jury on the issue of guilt and a subsequent trial
before a different jury on the issue of punishment.
These issues are now, and for some time have been, pending before
the Supreme Court of the United States.17 8 They were raised in a number
of North Carolina appeals and were all rejected, generally over the dissents
of Justice Sharp and Chief Justice Bobbitt who suggest that the North
Carolina court stay its hand pending resolution of these problems by the
Supreme Court.
X. OTHER IMPORTANT DECISIONS
The North Carolina Supreme Court handed down other significant
decisions during the period of this survey. There are not more than
one or two in each individual area of criminal procedure, and so they
are discussed collectively under appropriate sub-headings below.
A. Right to Confrontation
There is new doctrine in North Carolina regarding the use of the con-
fession of a codefendant who does not take the stand when that con-
fession implicates the accused. The situation is illustrated in State v.
Parrish.Y9 There, Parrish and Jimmy Harris were jointly charged with
... See cases cited note 178 infra.
.. McGautha v. California, 70 Cal. 2d 770, 452 P.2d 650 (1969), cert. granted,
38 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. June 1, 1970) (No. 486, 1969 Term, renumbered No. 203,
1970 Term); Crumpler v. Ohio, 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614 (1969), cert.
granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. June 1, 1970) (No. 709, 1969 Term, renumbered
204, 1970 Term); and see Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
1 275 N.C. 69, 165 S.E.2d 230 (1969).
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a series of house-breakings. Harris confessed and said that he and Parrish
had committed the crimes. Harris did not take the stand at the trial.
The confession was read to the jury. Since Harris did not take the stand
at trial, he was not subject to cross examination by Parrish concerning the
validity and authenticity of those portions of the confession implicating
Parrish. The supreme court, per Justice Huskins, ruled that this was
error and explained:
Defendant's position was unsound at the time this case was tried
below. At that time it was not error to admit the extra-judicial con-
fession of one defendant, even though it implicated a codefendant
against whom it was inadmissible, provided the trial judge instructed
the jury to consider the confession only against the defendant who made
it....
Since the trial of this case, however, the United States Supreme
Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 . . .held that in a
joint trial the admission of the confession of one defendant, who did
not take the stand, implicating the other violated the co-defendant's
right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. The decision in Bruton is retroactive....
The rule now applicable in North Carolina is summarized by Sharp,
J. with her usual clarity in State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277... as follows:
"The result is that in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to
exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all portions which implicate
defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice
either to the State or the declarant. If such deletion is not possible,
the State must choose between relinquishing the confession or trying
the defendants separately .... ,,180
B. Double Jeopardy
There is one recent "double jeopardy" decision, State v. Wright,18'
which is significant because of subsequent events. In that case, Wright
was accused of rape, was convicted, and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. His conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried anew.
He argued that he should not a second time be placed on trial for his
life since the earlier sentence of "life imprisonment" precluded the
possibility of a "death sentence." The court, per Justice Branch, not
only rejected this suggestion, but also held that because Wright was
180 Id. at 73-74, 165 S.E.2d at 234.
1 8275 N.C. 242, 166 S.E.2d 681 (1969).
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sentenced to life imprisonment, not death, on his second trial, "there
[was] no basis for this assignment of error."18 2
Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
held in Price v. Georgia'8 that if a man was once tried on a murder
charge and found guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary man-
slaughter and thereafter appealed and secured a reversal, he could not be
tried a second time on any charge higher than the lesser offense for
which he had been earlier convicted. Mr. Chief Justice Burger explained
that it was not "harmless error" because the petitioner on the second trial
"suffered no greater punishment on the subsequent conviction" because
"[t] he Double Jeopardy Clause. . . is cast in terms of the risk or hazard
of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the
verdict. To be charged and to be subjected to a second trial for first
degree murder is an ordeal not to be viewed lightly."'84 Although the
factual situation in the Price case differed from that in Wright, it is clear
that the North Carolina Supreme Court will have to rethink its holding.
A second issue concerning aspects of the double jeopardy clause was
also decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina during the survey
period: the issue of increased sentences after trial de novo in the superior
court on appeal from a lesser sentence in the district court after trial
without jury. The focal point of issue was the applicability of North
Carolina v. Pearce88 to this situation.
In Pearce, the defendant had been convicted in North Carolina of
assault to commit rape, and his conviction was reversed on appeal to the
North Carolina Supreme Court because an involuntary confession had
been used against him. Pearce was tried a second time, found guilty,
and a larger sentence was then imposed. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the "guarantee against double jeopardy imposes
no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconvic-
tion,' 8s but that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment pre-
cludes a procedure which serves to "chill the exercise of basic constitutional
rights."'81 7 One of these "basic rights" is the right to appeal, and the
possibility of a "vindictive" larger sentence upon retrial following a
... Id. at 247, 166 S.E.2d at 684.
188 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
18
' Id. at 331.
188395 U.S. 711 (1969).188 Id. at 719.187Id. at 724.
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successful appeal would certainly have "chilling effect." It follows, con-
cluded the Court, that due process of law:
requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having suc-
cessfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence
he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness
may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to
appeal. . . . Due process also requires that a defendant be freed of
apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sen-
tencing judge. 88
To assure the absence of such a vindictiveness, the Court held that when-
ever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial, the reasons for doing so must affirmatively appear, and the reasons
"must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable con-
duct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding."' 89
It was argued during the survey period that the rationale of Pearce
precludes the imposition of a harsher sentence upon appeal to the superior
court from a conviction in a district court. The argument goes this way.
Minor offenses are triable as of the first instance in the district court where
trial is not by jury. The state gives an absolute right to appeal an adverse
judgment of the district court to the superior court where there is a
trial de novo by a jury. If the superior court gives harsher sentences than
those appealed from, there will be a "chilling effect" on those who seek
review, and hence a denial of the right to a trial by jury.
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument. In
State v. Spencer,9' Justice Huskins wrote:
We think Pearce is factually distinguishable and has no applica-
tion here. There are many valid distinctions between a retrial in the
sanw court after reversal and trial de novo in a higher court upon
appeal-especially when the right of appeal is absolute and uncondi-
tional. Here, no defect in the first trial caused a retrial in the superior
court. Rather the trial there was de novo and a matter of absolute
right....
[w]hen these defendants appealed to the superior court the slate was
wiped clean and the cases stood for trial in the superior court as if
18 81 d. at 725.1 Id. at 726.1 State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970).
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there had been no previous trial in the district court. Hence, in the
sound discretion of the superior court judge, his sentence may be lighter
or heavier than that imposed in the district court.191
The Court added in a practical vein that:
To hold otherwise, and say that upon appeal the superior court judge
may decrease the sentence imposed below but is precluded from in-
creasing it, would encourage appeal to the superior court in every case.
Trial in the district court would be futile and the court itself an im-
pediment to the administration of justice.192
C. Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial guaranteed in the sixth amendment is made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.13  During the
survey period of this article, the North Carolina Supreme Court handed
down an opinion-State v. Johnson-'9 4 extending this protection to a
person arrested for a crime, but not charged with it until four years later.
Briefly, in that case, Johnson and a companion were arrested for the
holdup of a service station in Sharpsburg and taken to the Wilson County
jail. There, they were identified by the victim, and they confessed to the
crime, naming a third person as also being involved. They were also
charged with holding up other stores in the vicinity. This was in 1963.
They were indicted on the other charges, tried, convicted, and sentenced,
but they were not indicted on the holdup in Sharpsburg untl 1967. At
that time, their court-appointed attorney reported that "the case was then
so old he could find nobody who remembered anything about it." He
moved to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. The supreme court, per
Justice Sharp, ruled that it was error to deny this motion:
We here hold that when there has been an atypical delay in issuing a
warrant or in securing an indictment and the defendant shows (1) that
the prosecution deliberately and unnecessarily caused the delay for
the convenience or supposed advantage of the State; and (2) that the
length of the delay created a reasonable possibility of prejudice, de-
'o9 Id. at 545, 173 S.E.2d at 772 (emphasis in the original).%92 Id.193Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
°" State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969). See Note, Criminal
Procedure-The Potential Defendant's Right to a Speedy Trial, 48 N.C.L. Rv.
121 (1969), for an extensive discussion on this case.
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fendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial and the prosecution
must be dismissed.195
CONCLUSION
This, then, has been a brief glimpse of the processes of the admin-
istration of criminal justice in North Carolina during a recent period
of time. The reader must determine for himself if these processes measure
up to what he hopes and expects them to be.
191 275 N.C. at 277, 167 S.E.2d at 283.
